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Valuing labelling attributes with
hedonic price analysis: Australian wines
in the British wine market
July 5, 2002
Abstract
Over the past decade the market shares of New World wines has increased
dramatically in many European countries. More aggressive marketing, together
with a more distinct and recognisable labelling scheme, are often regarded as the
keys to marketing success. This article employs hedonic price analysis to identify
the values which marketers and consumers place on the information carried by the
label of Australian wines in the British wine retail market. Although many grape
varieties are found to be given a highly distinct valuation by market participants,
our results suggest that regions, rather than grape varieties, are considered as a
proxy for a brand. This contrasts with the general observation that grape varietal
labelling is the distinctive feature of New World wines. Marketing implications are
examined by considering the revenue impact of shifts in attributes at the retail level.
Key words: labelling, wine, Australia, product quality, hedonic price analysis
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1 Introduction
European wine markets have experienced rapid changes over the past decade. New World
wines have gained a signiﬁcant market share, particularly in those European countries
in which wine production is small or absent. Britain, the world trade centre for wine,
and the classic export destination for French and German wines, has most signiﬁcantly
turned to wines from the New World, particularly to wines from Australia and California.
Over the past four years, sales volumes of Australian wines in Britain have doubled
and the market share of French wines has fallen behind even that of Australian wines.
Australia has become the world's fourth largest wine exporter, behind France, Italy and
Spain. Although aggressive marketing may explain part of Australia's export success,
a distinctive and instantly recognizable labelling scheme is likely to have contributed
to this success. How, therefore, do consumers value the labelling information provided,
and what exactly are the most distinctive labelling attributes which consumers value in
Australian wines?
Using the example of observed consumer choices of heterogeneous bundles of labelling
attributes in the British retail market for Australian wine, this paper employs hedonic
price analysis to explore the implicit valuation that market participants make of those
components of heterogeneous attribute bundles.
Frederick Waugh (1928) relied on observed consumer choices for asparagus to pioneer
the development of hedonic price analysis in agricultural economics. His analysis of veg-
etable prices is based on the hypothesis that quality of vegetables is related to measurable
speciﬁcation variables. Court (1939), in a study on automobile demand, essentially incor-
porated the hedonic hypothesis that heterogeneous goods are aggregations of attributes
(in today's Gorman (1980) - Lancaster (1966) sense), and that economic behaviour relates
to these attributes.1 He was ﬁrst to attribute the constructed price indices as 'hedonic
price indices'. However, the fact that until today hedonic analysis has been applied to a
large ﬁeld of quality-related issues is largely due to the work of Zvi Griliches and Sherwin
Rosen. The foundations were laid by the characteristics approach of Griliches (Griliches
(1961) and Griliches (1971)) to the construction of price indices and his subsequent work,
as well as by the unifying approach of Rosen (1974), in which varying marginal implicit
prices are derived from both a distribution of marginal rates of substitution and marginal
rates of transformation.2 Hedonic studies have been motivated by two main concerns.
First, to identify implicit prices of attributes. And second, to investigate welfare im-
pacts by analysing the structure of demand for attributes (Follain and Jimenez (1985),
Bresnahan and Gordon (1997)).
Hedonic price analysis has found its application in several recent studies on wine, among
1Though Gorman's paper was written in 1956, it was not published until 1980.
2The generalised commodity approach to demand analysis (Houthakker (1952) was the ﬁrst one to
present the hedonic function as a market phenomenon. Existing literature on hedonic quality mea-
surement before Lancaster (1971) had already proved that the analysis of consumption at the level
of characteristics is more powerful than the traditional analysis (Triplett 1971). A study of Gorman
(1980)'s theory of linear consumption activities shows that Lancaster (1971) followed Gorman in speci-
fying hedonic contours.
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them Golan and Shalit (1993), Oczkowski (1994), Nerlove (1995) and Combris, Lecocq,
and Visser (1997). In Golan and Shalit's (1993) study on hedonic grape and wine pricing,
the authors aim to identify and evaluate the wine quality characteristics of Israeli grapes.
By assuming that the Californian wine market is perfectly competitive, wine prices are
presumed to reﬂect both consumer preferences and the value of grape quality attributes.
If, therefore, Californian and Israeli wine consumers have the same preferences, the com-
petitiveness assumption can be used to derive hedonic prices for the Israeli market. By
estimating the relative contribution of grape characteristics to wine quality, and using
the monetary values from the Californian market, the authors are able to value the indi-
vidual grape characteristics so as to provide a producer pricing schedule for Israel. This
quality based pricing schedule could then serve to reduce the production of poor-quality
wines, by giving Israeli farmers an appropriate incentive to supply higher quality grapes.
Oczkowski (1994) identiﬁes the implicit valuation of table wine attributes for consumers
and retailers from recommended retail prices for Australian premium table wine. On the
producer side, the author suggests that the hedonic functions estimated provide impor-
tant information upon which longer-term investment decisions may be made. Oczkowski
includes dummy variables for producer size in the hedonic regression and argues that this
allows for two eﬀects. First, for possible price-making strategies and second, he argues in
favour of viewing producer size as measuring the characteristic of 'exclusiveness'. That
is, some consumers desire particular wines from small producers because of their limited
availability, rarity and 'trendiness'. The author's innovative approach to the underlying
dummy variable model permits explicit estimation of coeﬃcients for all dummy variables.
Due to state intervention in the pricing of Swedish wines, Nerlove (1995) does not follow
a standard hedonic regression, but assumes that variety prices are exogeneously deter-
mined and consumer preferences are expressed by the quantities of each variety they
buy. Therefore, variety supplies are taken as perfectly elastic for the group of consumers
being considered and the quantities of each variety consumed are regressed on the unit
variety price and on the measures of quality attributes which characterise that variety.
Nerlove (1995) builds on a generalisation of the 'pure repackaging' case, which Fisher and
Shell (1971) label the 'variable repackaging' case of quality diﬀerences, and in which the
amount of repackaging is allowed to depend on the quantity of the good. Using Swedish
data from 1989-91, the price elasticity is estimated to be about - 1.65, which suggests
that Swedish consumers are highly sensitive to price. Estimates of the implicit valuations
of quality attributes are shown to diﬀer greatly from those obtained from the classical
hedonic regression with price as the dependent variable.
Whilst studying wine prices for the Bordeaux region, Combris et al. (1997) apply a step-
wise regression procedure to investigate whether quality matters in explaining market
prices. The authors suggest that for their data set, quality as measured by a jury grade
assigned by professional wine tasters, is mainly explained by the 'subjective' sensory
characteristics of the wine, which are unobservable when consumers choose the wine.
Implicit price estimates are derived from data of a wine tasting panel that is unable to
observe any of the 'objective characteristics' (grape variety, vintage year etc.), including
price, of the wines they judge. By contrasting the results from this regression of market
prices of Bordeaux wine with characteristics appearing on the label of the bottle with the
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results from an analysis of jury grades, the authors conclude that many variables which
are important in explaining quality do not play a role in the determination of market
prices. The authors explain their ﬁndings with taste diﬀerences between wine tasters and
consumers and imperfect information on the wine consumers' behalf.
Several papers have recently addressed labelling issues explicitly when product attribute
information is imperfect and asymmetric. In the context of international trade and
economic growth, Basu, Chau, and Grote (2002) examine the eﬀectiveness of eco-labels
in providing a market-based solution to the under-consumption of eco-friendly products in
developing and developed countries. Nimon and Beghin (1999) examine the implications
of eco-labelling schemes on consumer choice sets and product quality in the trade of
textile and apparel. Mahé (1997) and Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina (1998) investigate
the role of information on quality attributes and the role of quality labelling in the
process of agricultural trade liberalisation and in determining welfare eﬀects from such
de-regulation. Marette, Crespi, and Schiavina (1999) analyse the impact of certiﬁed
quality labelling on welfare when common labelling schemes matter and asymmetric
information is present. Bureau, Gozlan, and Marette (2001) investigate the informational
role of quality labelling for trade policy and welfare when adverse selection matters due
to the presence of risks of food hazards. In a vertical diﬀerentiation model, Ibanez and
Stenger (2000) investigate the eﬃciency of labelling mentioning food safety as a means to
reducing negative production externalities and raising consumer welfare. By expanding
an AIDS model to include information eﬀects and demographic characteristics, Teisl
and Levy (1997) show that nutrient labelling can aﬀect consumer purchase behaviour
in signiﬁcant ways. Van der Lans, van Ittersum, de Cicco and Loseby (2001) employ
a conjoint analysis to show that PDO (Protected Designation of Origin) labels have no
direct eﬀect on consumer preferences in the case of olive oil. Bonnet and Simioni (2001)
use a random-coeﬃcients logit model of demand to recover the distribution of consumers'
willingness-to-pay for labelled cheese, and to demonstrate that consumers do not value
the quality signal provided by PDO labels for these French cheeses (Camembert).
This paper aims to examine wine labelling attributes by estimating hedonic price func-
tions for Australian still light wine that was on oﬀer in the British oﬀ-licence market.3
Since the following empirical analysis relies on data from 1994, we will brieﬂy introduce
developments on the supply and demand side around that period. The wine market in
the United Kingdom (UK) was and is dominated by a large variety of foreign still light
wine imports (more than 90 percent, value 1994). English and Welsh wine, produced
from fresh grapes, accounts for only 0.3 percent (value, 1997) of domestic consumption.
Two types of licences give the right to sell alcoholic beverages in the UK. The oﬀ-licence,
where the product is consumed outside the premises in which it was purchased (e.g. retail
outlets), and the on-licence where alcohol is consumed in situ (e.g. pubs, clubs and
restaurants). With more than 45,000 points of sale and 70 percent of total wine sales
in 1993 (value), the oﬀ-licence sector dominates the wine market in the UK. Regarding
the evolution of sales by country of origin, the big four traditional suppliers, France,
Germany, Italy and Spain, continue to dominate but, collectively, if not in all cases indi-
3Still light wine is deﬁned as the product obtained exclusively from the total or partial alcoholic
fermentation of fresh grapes or fresh musts, with a total alcoholic strength usually not exceeding 15
percent volume.
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vidually, have seen their share eroded. Their combined share declined from 89 percent of
volume of imported wine from fresh grapes in 1983 to 78 percent in 1993 and 71.5 percent
in 2000 (DWI (2002)). Most countries depend heavily upon oﬀ-licence sales, with France
and, to a lesser extent, Germany depending disproportionally upon the on-licence trade.
With the exception of Northern Ireland, Great Britain is the EU member which is charac-
terised by the lowest level of per capita consumption. With 64,5 litres annual per capita
wine consumption in 1992, France was leading worldwide consumption, whereas in the
UK only 12,4 litres were consumed in the same year (Robinson 1994). Considering the
consumption pattern according to colour, the sales shares in 1993 by volume of imported
still light wine in the UK were 63.7 percent for white, 33.2 percent for red and 2.9 percent
for rose (EIU 1994).
This article contributes to and distinguishes itself from the existing hedonic price liter-
ature on wine markets in several ways. First, we expand the dummy variable approach
that was pioneered by Kennedy (1986) and Oczkowski (1994) to obtain a distinct and
comparable contribution for each attribute to the variation of goods prices. The econo-
metric approach addresses heteroscedasticity explicitly by using a General least squares
(GLS) estimator. Second, in contrast to previous papers we do not rely on sensory char-
acteristics. Rather, we have two sets of variables upon which we place our hypotheses.
We consider objective attributes, which can be observed by consumers from the label and
are thus assumed to determine the use value and tasting qualities of the wine. However,
we also consider retailer traits as an additional choice variable that does not impact on
the tasting qualities directly. Third, in contrast to previous hedonic studies related to
wine, we do not rely on recommended retailer prices, but rather on actual retail prices.
Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of studying the valuation of attribute information
within the hedonic framework by considering the revenue impact of shifts in attributes
at the retail level.
In section (2) of the paper, the theoretical framework for describing agents' valuation
of wine attributes is brieﬂy developed from previous models of product diﬀerentiation.
This is followed by a statement of objectives and hypotheses. Section (3) begins with a
description of the survey data employed and provides an empirical assessment of postu-
lates from the above. Section (4) explores marketing implications of shifts in attributes
at the retailer level.
2 A hedonic price analysis
2.1 Methodological issues
Houthakker (1952) and Theil (1952) proposed independently a model of consumer choice
based on product characteristics. Houthakker (1952), who assumes a continuous spec-
trum of product qualities, was the ﬁrst to develop a market notion of hedonic prices.
This contrasts with the Lancaster (1971) model and its variants, which consider hedo-
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nic price functions as a reﬂection of consumer behaviour only and assume a discrete
spectrum of alternative qualities. In Rosen's (1974) model of product diﬀerentiation,
upon which this paper relies, this market notion is developed further. Market clearing
conditions determine the set of hedonic prices, where hedonic prices are deﬁned as the
implicit prices of attributes as they are revealed to economic agents from observed prices
and speciﬁc amounts of those characteristics which are associated with them. What is
being estimated in Rosen's (1974) description of a competitive equilibrium is the locus
of intersections of the demand curves of diﬀerent consumers with varying tastes and the
supply functions of diﬀerent producers with possibly varying technologies of production.
The implicit estimated prices for quality give us, therefore, the implicit marginal valua-
tion that consumers and producers place on a vector of attributes. Consider a vector of
wine attributes (z1, ..., zn), and a composite good with vector x. When consumers choose
one unit of wine, the maximisation of utility U(x, z) subject to the consumer's budget
constraint,
y ≥ p(z) + x, (1)
where y denotes consumer income and p(x) reﬂects the per unit price, satisﬁes the ﬁrst-
order conditions,
∂p
∂zi
= pi =
∂U/∂zi
∂U/∂x
, ∀ i. (2)
The marginal rate of substitution between wine attribute zi and x equals, therefore, the
marginal price of wine attribute zi.
Following Rosen (1974), we consider a one-period model of wine consumers' choice be-
haviour, in which the agent chooses one wine attribute bundle at a time from among a
number of diﬀerent wine attribute bundles. We assume that under perfect competition,
market equilibrium conditions are reﬂected in the valuation of the attributes. Although
it is assumed that only certain attribute combinations can be selected in a reshued form
(the consumer ﬁnds a Chardonnay 1993, either from Hunter or from Barossa Valley),
we assume that any quantity can be supplied to match consumer demand. Hence, we
conjecture perfect divisibility.
2.2 Objectives and hypotheses
We aim to examine implicit prices for labelling attributes through the estimation of
hedonic price functions. It is assumed that when consumers are confronted with the
labels of the bottles on the shelf, a ﬁrst group of categories of attributes (colour, grape
variety, vintage, region of origin) determines the use value of the wine. Another category
group, the originating retailer, is deemed to have no bearing on this use value and is
therefore assumed as not entering the consumer's utility function for tasting qualities.
Consumers' willingness-to-pay should, therefore, be determined by variables from the
ﬁrst group of categories only, unless retailer traits enter the utility function in an indirect
way.4 Since we have no information on individual retailer traits, we assume that the
4Although Bliss (1988) does not refer to retailer traits explicitly, his use of indirect utility functions
in a model of a multiproduct monopolist allows to distinguish some retailers by oﬀering better value
for money to the consumer.
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valuation which the consumer places on the name of the retailer reﬂects the aggregate
valuation of relevant retailer traits to the consumer.5
Since our implicit prices are assumed to reﬂect an equilibrium price relationship, they
can be given both a user value and a resource cost interpretation. Hence, we assume that
retailers themselves incur costs to build a reputation based upon their own traits. They
regard reputation as an asset, as they receive a competitive return on their reputation
investment.6 In a market where reputation eﬀects are likely to be important, we assume
that the degree of information which the consumer possesses about the wines will be
reﬂected in his or her degree of product involvement. This degree of product involvement
can be identiﬁed by the analyst from the willingness of wine consumers to diﬀerentiate
between, and pay for, diﬀerent attributes within the total attribute bundle. We assume,
therefore, that the further down their decision trees consumers are willing to proceed, the
more distinct attributes they are willing to pay for, and the higher must be their level of
information about the attributes which they are comparing.
2.3 Model specification
Our variables have to undergo a modiﬁcation that alters the interpretation of the esti-
mates only. This is due to the nature of the data (dummy variables) and due to the
necessity to retain comparability across attributes. The modiﬁcation does not alter the
underlying meaning of the implicit price estimates as 'missing prices' in a hypothetical
market where both consumers and producers are asked to attribute their valuation to the
existence of a particular wine attribute, ceteris paribus. As a result of this modiﬁcation,
and after adjusting the coeﬃcient estimates with the estimated variances, the ﬁnal inter-
pretation is that the coeﬃcient estimates measure the relative impact on the dependent
variable (the unit price evaluated at the sample means) of the presence of the attribute
ceteris paribus.
Economic theory suggests that non-linear functional forms could frequently provide a
more appropriate alternative, although the choice of the functional form for the he-
donic price function should remain an empirical matter. Also, on pragmatic grounds,
with respect to heteroscedasticity, a non-linear form such as the semilogarithmic (log-
lin) model could be preferable. In this instance, the coeﬃcient of a dummy variable
measures the percentage eﬀect on the dependent variable of the presence of the factor
represented by the dummy variable. However, Kennedy (1981) objects to the interpreta-
tion of Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) of estimating the percentage eﬀect on asymptotic
5Betancourt and Malanoski (1995) provide empirical evidence of the mechanisms through which
retail distribution services (cleanliness, short wait for checkout, unit pricing on shelves, convenient store
location) aﬀect demand, costs and retail competition. The authors demonstrate that for their sample of
616 supermarkets across the United States, distribution services have a positive eﬀect on the demand
for product.
6Shapiro (1983) demonstrates that the introduction of reputation as an asset that must initially built
up allows the construction of an equilibrium model that includes perfect competition, free entry, and
quality choices by ﬁrms under imperfect information.
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grounds.7 Kennedy (1981) argues that their suggested procedure leads to a biased esti-
mator for the dummy variable. Instead of estimating g by
gˆ = exp(cˆ)− 1, (3)
he suggests to follow Goldberger (1968) and to estimate g by
g? = exp
(
cˆ− 1
2
Vˆ (cˆ)
)
− 1, (4)
(where Vˆ (cˆ) is an estimate of the variance of cˆ), which is assumed to have less bias than
gˆ. A procedure for adjusting dummy variable coeﬃcient estimates which does not require
to discard variables from the equation was put forward by Suits (1984). He interprets
the estimates as deviations from average behaviour.8 Following Suits (1984), we impose
identifying restrictions, but instead of employing Kennedy's (1986) laborious extension
of Suits (1984), we expand on Oczkowski (1994), and substitute the full constraint into
the original equation. Following symmetrical estimations, it is possible to obtain all
coeﬃcient estimates. If, for example, the objective was to get coeﬃcient estimates for
wine colours (red, white, rose: C1, C2, C3) and, say, three producer regions of a given
county (R1, R2, R3), the following constraints (5) and (6) could be substituted into the
original equation (9) as,
α1Pc1 + α2Pc2 + α3Pc3 = 0
α1 = [−(α2Pc2)/Pc1 − (α3Pc3)/Pc1] (5)
where Pc indicates the mean, hence the proportion of non-zero's, in the colour categories
for each bottle of wine. And,
β1Pr1 + β2Pr2 + β3Pr3 = 0
β2 = [−(β1Pr1)/Pr2 − (β3Pr3)/Pr2], (6)
where Pr reﬂects the proportion of non-zero's in the region categories for each bottle of
wine. This, substituted into the original equation, gives
P = [−(α2Pc2)/Pc1 − (α3Pc3)/Pc1]C1 + α2C2 + α3C3 + β1R1
+[−(β1Pr1)/Pr2 − (β3Pr3)/Pr2]R2 + β3R3 (7)
and,
P = α2[C2 − (Pc2/Pc1)C1] + α3[C3 − (Pc3/Pc1)C1]
7Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) use the general form of a log-lin equation, lnY = a +
∑
i biXi +∑
j cjDj , where Xi denote continuous variables and Dj represent the dummy variables. When con-
sidering a single dummy variable, the interpretation of the coeﬃcient of the dummy variable becomes
more transparent when transforming the above equation to Y = (1 + g)Dexp(a +
∑
i biXi), where
g = (Y1 − Y0)/Y0. Y1 and Y0 denote the values of the dependent variable when the dummy is equal to
one and zero, respectively. The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable is thus c = ln(1 + g), and the relative
eﬀect on Y of the presence of the factor represented by the dummy is given by g = exp(c) − 1. The
percentage eﬀect of the dummy variable on Y , in units of Y , is found by applying the antilog function,
100 ·g = 100 · exp(c)− 1, which is the percentage diﬀerence associated with being in group 1 rather than
being in the reference group.
8Instead of forcing one of the coeﬃcients of the dummy variables to be zero, all of them could be
restricted to zero and the resulting intercept can be interpreted as the average of the intercepts of all
observations in the sample.
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+β1[R1 − (Pr1/Pr2)R2] + β3[R3 − (Pr3/Pr2)R2] (8)
The corresponding hedonic model assumes therefore,
p = α2[Xa2] + α3[Xa3] + β1[Xb1] + β3[Xb3] + ε. (9)
where p is a N × 1 vector of transformed observations on the dependent variable, price
per bottle P , there are four N × 1 vectors of X of observations, α and β deﬁne the
unknown parameters, and ε is a N × 1 vector of unknown stochastic disturbances. A
symmetrical substitution generates estimates for the remaining coeﬃcients α1 and β2
(symmetrical regressions). Importantly, this speciﬁcation would embody an equivalence
eﬀect, if we were to apply the traditional way of dropping one category to avoid perfect
multicollinearity. The eﬀect of grape variety, for example, i.e., the estimated implicit
price diﬀerences between Cabernet Sauvignon and Shiraz, would be assumed to be the
same across all regions. Therefore, a model should be speciﬁed that provides suﬃcient
ﬂexibility to allow diﬀerential eﬀects to show. Interaction terms will be introduced, which
enable us to test for these diﬀerential eﬀects.9
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 The data
The paper uses data on prices and attributes of Australian still wines from a survey
that was undertaken in August 1994 in 94 retail outlets of diﬀerent commercial forms
in England and Scotland (see Appendix A). Retailers were selected according to market
share to give a representative sample of Australian still wines sold oﬀ-licence in those
regions. Each price for a bottle of wine is, where appropriate, described by a combination
of the following dimensions:
colour vintage importer
grape variety volume producer
region of origin place of bottling
The survey collected thus all information that appears on the label of the bottles, except
for the degree of alcohol. It reveals in how many outlets per company a uniquely identiﬁed
bottle was found. We employ this information as quantity proxy. In total, the data set is
comprised of 1,495 bottles (prices). This number of bottles is due to the fact that there
are 274 uniquely identiﬁed bottles of still wines that appear thus on average in 5.4 retail
outlets of the same commercial form.
9The interaction terms of primary interest are those for region/variety. The coeﬃcient estimates
for those product variables estimate then the diﬀerential eﬀect of region by variety. For example, the
interaction term for grape variety and region estimates the extent to which, say, the eﬀect of being
Chardonnay diﬀers for Hunter versus Barossa Valley.
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3.2 The functional form
Regarding the functional form in hedonic regressions, there is little theoretical guidance.
Our initial objective would be to include all forms that theory shows are plausible. How-
ever, as all our explanatory variables are dummy variables, the choice of the functional
form is limited to the linear and the log-lin, i.e., semilog, speciﬁcation. Nevertheless,
the use of interaction terms allows us to gain additional ﬂexibility. When we employ a
log-lin hedonic price function, we assume nonconstant marginal Engel prices (the prices
paid for incremental units of characteristics when purchased as part of the same bundle)
and constancy of relative prices with respect to changes in proportions of characteristics
(Triplett 1975). This log-lin speciﬁcation assumes therefore homotheticity of the utility
function, hence homogeneity of degree zero of the demand equations for attributes. Since
only relative prices matter, the imputed price is independent of the level of the charac-
teristic, which appears to be a realistic and convenient assumption, since only dummy
variables are used as explanatory variables in the present model. Also, since the log-lin
form allows each marginal implicit price to be a nonlinear function of the entire set of
characteristics, it appears as an attractive alternative hypothesis, since it accommodates
the idea that bundling constraints are present for wine attributes in a bottle of wine.
3.3 Data analysis and specification search
To estimate the above functional relationship, the following modeling strategy borrows
from several methodologies, namely from those frequently associated with David Hendry
and Edward Leamer. The present analysis follows Leamer's (1990) 'classical' references
to sensitivity analysis, and subsequent attempts to simplify the models by incorporating
the insights gained from speciﬁcation uncertainty diagnostics and measurement error
diagnostics. Although the Hendry methodology is time series based, Hendry's 'general-
to-speciﬁc' approach and the related steps, are thought to be appropriate in the present
cross-sectional context (Hendry (2000)).10 The evaluation of the resulting model by
extensive analysis of residuals and predictive performance is borrowed from the ﬁnal
step of Hendry's analysis. We expand the above approach by applying the diagnostic
framework suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980), and Belsley (1986), to uncover
statistical problems in an OLS framework. By proceeding in this fashion, it is hoped that
the strengths of the above approaches can be applied together, so as to ensure a robust
estimation procedure that provides stable implicit price estimates. We follow Leamer
(1990) in distinguishing three phases in data analysis: (1) estimation, (2) sensitivity
analysis and (3) simpliﬁcation.
10See Hansen (1996) for a discussion of Hendry's speciﬁcation searches and his 'general-to-speciﬁc'
approach.
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3.3.1 Estimation
Model selection
The following estimation and testing procedure is rigorously pursued, as theory does
not provide further guidance to the inclusion of variables in the present application (it is
assumed that all pre-selected variables have a resource cost/user value interpretation). In
the initial regression, we included region of origin, brand, importer, grape variety, colour
and vintage, jointly with a subset of interaction terms: interactions for colour/region of
origin, grape variety/region of origin, and vintage/region of origin. Following this pre-
selection of regressors, the subsequent selection procedure, based on the single equation
hedonic approach, does not follow a purely mechanical procedure - such as stepwise
regression - as the dangers of doing so are well established (e.g. Wallace and Ashar
(1972); Judge and Bock (1983); Leamer (1983); Greene (2000)).
Speciﬁcation tests
We begin by testing for equality of implicit price contributions. This is implemented in
two ways, while relying most heavily on the second. First, we follow Berndt et al. (1993)
and compensate for the large sample size by choosing very tight signiﬁcance levels for the
standard F-tests (.01 signiﬁcance level). Second, we follow Ohta and Griliches (1975) and
Ohta and Griliches (1986), who suggest speciﬁcally for hedonic models to consider the
diﬀerence in ﬁt between the unconstrained and constrained regressions, and not to reject
the simpler hypothesis unless they are very diﬀerent. Hence, we compare the standard
errors (SER) of both regressions. However, we consider the null hypothesis of parameter
equality only as relevant, if it is based on economic signiﬁcance rather than on statistical
signiﬁcance. If the diﬀerence in SER of the regression is smaller than or equal to .01 in
the system under the test, the null hypothesis will not be rejected on practical grounds.
As the regression is semilogarithmic, an increase in SER by .01 implies an increase in
the standard deviation of the unexplained component of price of about 1 percent.11 In
searching for the most parsimonious speciﬁcation, we follow Berndt et al. (1993) in
rejecting the null-hypothesis when the root mean squared errors under the alternative
results in a reduction of more than 5 percent in the standard deviation of the unexplained
variation of log prices. The following speciﬁcation tests were applied:
11Consider a diﬀerence in the standard errors in the constrained and unconstrained regressions of .01
and a SER of the constrained regressions that was .1. The implication is that the lack of ﬁt of the
constrained regression is increased by 10 percent compared with that of the unconstrained regression
(.01/.1 = .1). Equally, if the SER was .2, the .01 criterion implies the willingness to accept up to a 5
percent deterioration in the ﬁt of the model as measured by the standard error of its residuals.
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(a) Tests for Heteroscedasticity
The Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan 1979) and its extension by Koenker (1981)
is used. We apply weighted regressions as this has a double advantage. First, it permits
us to correct for heteroscedasticity by transforming the error terms.12 However, it also
satisﬁes hedonic theory, as each attribute should be accounted for in terms of its market
signiﬁcance. Hence, using weighted regressions, where the weights reﬂect a proxy for the
quantity demanded, should provide meaningful results.
(b) Speciﬁcation tests for collinearity
Multicollinearity may give rise to two serious problems in hedonic models (Atkinson and
Crocker 1987). First, the mean squared error of the estimator may cause substantial
instabilities in coeﬃcient signs and magnitudes as independent variables are added or
removed from the model. Second, measurement error bias may be transferred in part to
collinear variables measured without error and may alter their signs.
(i) As in standard analysis, we consider F -values, t-values and corrected R-square to-
gether, and ask whether there is a lack of individual signiﬁcance despite overall sig-
niﬁcance and high corrected R-square. Furthermore, the Akaike information criterion
(AIC) is selected here in order to attempt a judgment about the trade-oﬀ between model
complexity and goodness of ﬁt.13
(ii) We run auxiliary regressions, as collinearity can appear both in the form of linear
dependence between variables, and as a lack of variation in the values of a control vari-
able about its mean. Thus, both auxiliary regression R square and the sum of squared
least squares residuals from the auxiliary regression are considered together (Berndt and
Griliches 1993).
(iii) Finally, the condition number of the data matrix is examined (Belsley, et al. 1980).
Judge, Griﬃth, Hill, Lütkepohl, and Lee (1985) suggest that moderate to strong near
exact linear dependencies are associated with condition indices between 30 and 100.
3.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We aim to perform a robust estimation procedure that is able to produce estimates which
are insensitive to model misspeciﬁcations. Thus, we follow Leamer (1990) in his 'classical
approach' to sensitivity analysis by investigating whether inference is fragile and not
believable. We apply techniques for discovering inﬂuential observations, as developed by
12Since the present analysis employs GLS, only one form of heteroscedasticity is tested for. Given
the weights in the present study, is assumed that the error variance varies with the expected price.
The consequence is that White's (White 1980) heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation
cannot be employed. The Goldfeld-Quandt test is not used as it may lack power if an error variance is
present that is related to more than one variable.
13We prefer the AIC to the Schwarz criterion in the present context of a large number of potential
variables, as the latter penalises model complexity much more heavily.
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Belsley et al. (1980). These techniques are complemented by applying the trimmed least
squares estimation method as performed by SHAZAM.14
Three means for deletion diagnostics are examined (Belsley et al. 1980). First, we
consider single-row diagnostics. We investigate the change in the estimated regression
coeﬃcients that would occur if the i-th observation were deleted. This diagnostic measure
(DFFIT) has the advantage of being independent from the particular co-ordinate system
used to form the regression model. Scaling this measure with the standard deviation of
the ﬁt displays a scaled row-deleted change in ﬁt (DFFITS). Second, we examine the hat
matrix by studying the diagonal elements of the least-squares projection.15 Finally, we
are also running a Lagrange-Multiplier test for normality (Jarque-Bera). We exploit the
link between the hat matrix and the residual variance by investigating the standardised
residual (studentised residual). If the observation conforms to the model that is estimated
with other observations, this standardised residual should be small (the calculation is
repeated for each observation). Absolute values less than two are acceptable in terms
of the model speciﬁcation. Others are regarded as outliers. Since some of the most
inﬂuential data points can have relatively small studentised residuals, row deletion and
the analysis of residuals are studied together and on an equal footing (Belsley et al., 1980:
21).
We follow Belsley et al. (1980: 22) to perform row deletions. The authors suggest
to employ the COVRAT statistic and to compare the covariance matrix using all data
with the covariance matrix that results when the i-th row has been deleted. Since this
magnitude is a ratio of the estimated generalised variances of the regression coeﬃcients
with and without the i-th observation deleted from the data, it can be interpreted as
a measure of the eﬀect of the i-th observation on the eﬃciency of coeﬃcient estimation
(Belsley et al., 1980: 48). As the two matrices diﬀer only by the inclusion of the i-th row
in the sum of squares and cross products, values of this ratio near unity can be taken
to indicate that the two covariance matrices are close, or that the covariance matrix is
insensitive to the deletion of row i. A value of COVRAT greater than one indicates,
therefore, that the absence of the associated observation impairs eﬃciency.
For detecting those observations that are most strongly inﬂuential in relation to the
others, we follow Belsley et al. (1980) and apply external scaling with corresponding size-
adjusted cutoﬀ values. If observations have a high leverage and a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the estimated parameters, we consider them as presenting potentially serious problems.
14All regressions were performed by using SHAZAM, version 7.0..
15This hat matrix (equation 2.15 in Besley et al., 1980) determines the ﬁtted values. Since the diagonal
elements of the hat matrix have a distance interpretation, they provide a basic starting point for revealing
'multivariate outliers' which would not be revealed by scatter plots when p > 2.
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3.4 Discussion of the empirical results
Summary statistics are presented in Appendix B. The hedonic price functions are es-
timated by employing a General least squares (GLS) estimator.16 The resulting GLS
regressions were performed for two reasons. First, employing GLS rather than OLS as an
estimation rule is pursued on the basis that each attribute (and its price) in the context
of hedonic market studies is important only to the extent that it captures some relevant
fraction of the market (Griliches 1961). Here, the weights applied in the GLS regres-
sions reﬂect in how many retail outlets of each retailer type (e.g. Marks and Spencer) a
uniquely identiﬁed bottle was found. It is therefore implicitly assumed that the sample
fractions are directly proportionate to the number of bottles sold. Second, the imple-
mentation of GLS allows us to account for heteroscedasticity due to omitted variables
and/or due to misspeciﬁcation.
The linear speciﬁcation was rejected in favour of the log-lin model. It was suggested
that certain categories of attributes (quality designation, grape variety, region of origin,
vintage) determine the use value of the wine, and enter, therefore, the utility function of
the consumer. Another category was assumed not to have any bearing on this use value
(the retailer). The willingness-to-pay of the consumer would therefore be determined
by variables from the ﬁrst group of categories. However, the results suggest that the
retailer in which the bottle is chosen (and thus the retailer traits) aﬀect consumer choice
in signiﬁcant ways. Although it was not possible to compare exact attribute bundles
across 'non-taste attributes' (namely the retailers), distinct and signiﬁcant valuation of
retailers were identiﬁed. The results indicate that consumers attach a high value to
the information provided on the label. In all cases where conditional eﬀects between
attributes were found to have a signiﬁcant impact on price, consumers are viewed as
regarding these attribute bundles as imperfect substitutes. In these instances of more
than overall impacts, outstanding grape varieties are shown to have a strongly positive
or negative regional impact on price just as outstanding regions have a similar grape
varietal impact.
The estimation results of the log-lin hedonic model are given in Appendix C. The
estimates are interpreted as follows.
The greatest impact of retailer traits on price is achieved by wines from Australia sold
under the own-label of Asda (-15.9 percent) and Marks and Spencer (+30.3 percent).17
This is, in both instances, more accentuated than in the case of a consumer who is as-
sumed not to be discriminating between countries of origin. It is therefore suggested that
the consumer's view is that (consistently) higher qualities of Australian wines are oﬀered
by Marks and Spencer's own-branded wines, and therefore, the "Australian consumer"
may value the traits of this retailer more highly than an average, non-discriminating
consumer. The reverse holds for Asda.
16The regressions were implemented as weighted least squares regressions, where ordinary least squares
(OLS) are applied to a transformed model.
17Asda is a large grocery and non-food retailer, known for high volume and value for money. Marks and
Spencer, in contrast, whose reputation is built on quality, dependability and good value, is a traditional
retailer that is tailored towards consumer groups with higher income.
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However, it may appear somewhat unexpected that Sainsbury and Tesco (-17.6 percent
and -7.8 percent respectively) are among the few retailers of Australian wines whose
traits are valued distinctly diﬀerently both by an 'Australian' as well as by a 'non-
discriminating' consumer. This suggests that Sainsbury and Tesco have been far less
able to supply a desired spectrum of 'Australian attributes', as compared to all their
competitors in this sample.
Only four vintages are found to have an impact on price that diﬀers from average, with
older vintages gaining consistently in valuation. The 1992 vintage best represents an
average vintage. However, the valuation of the diﬀerent vintages should be regarded
with caution. If unmeasured quality attributes make certain vintages survive in the
market, the vintage coeﬃcients could reﬂect these unmeasured quality diﬀerences among
the surviving wines.18
Not surprising appears the impact on price of Coonawarra (+22.3 percent) and Barossa
Valley (+9.3), both well-known regions in South Australia. Perhaps somewhat disap-
pointing is consumers' valuation of Hunter Valley (+11.1 percent), especially in relation
to Kings Valley (+16.9 percent) and Goulburn Valley (+14.3 percent). However, the
rather small sample size for the latter two suggests some caution in interpreting the
estimates, as is the case for Riverina (-34.3 percent).
The most average impact that a region has on price comes from South Australia (-4.1
percent). Not unexpected is the fact that consumers appear to value wines from a broad
distinctly regional area (a state) diﬀerently from wines that originate from particular
districts within those areas. This is the case for both Barossa and Coonawarra, as
well as for Riverina (-34.3 percent) and Hunter Valley (-11.1 percent), when compared
to their originating state, New South Wales (-6.5 percent). The degree of information
which consumers possess about the wines purchased appears thus to be reﬂected in the
willingness-to-pay. Hence the further down their decision trees consumers are willing to
proceed, the higher will be their level of information about the attributes which they are
comparing.
As for grape varieties, it is surprising that the two dominant red varietals, Shiraz (also
part of Australia's export success), and Cabernet Sauvignon (+2.4 percent), have only
a close to average impact on price (or none at all in the case of Shiraz). However, a
distinctly diﬀerent impact on price emerges for Cabernet Sauvignon from Coonawarra
(+26.3 percent), as well as for Cabernet Sauvignon from New South Wales (-39.4 per-
cent). Given the great impact on price of Cabernet originating regions, together with
the only average valuation for Cabernet itself, our results suggest that consumers regard
the region, rather than the grape variety as a proxy for a brand.
Equally surprising may seem the valuation of Cabernet Shiraz (-13.9 percent) and the
impact that Pinot Noir has on price (+90.4 percent). Although Pinot Noir is successfully
planted in Victoria, the high and distinct recognition of Pinot Noir in relation to its
originating state (+15.5 percent) comes as unexpected. However, both Chardonnay and
Shiraz are highly important in Victorian exports. The low relative impact that Chardon-
18See Berndt et al. (1993) for a discussion of age coeﬃcients among microcomputers.
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nay has on price (+9.7 percent), together with the absence of a regional impact for Shiraz,
provide some rationale for the relatively low impact that Victoria has. However, since
Pinot Noir contributes only with 1 percent to the sample, further interpretation should
be taken with caution.
As for Riesling, it is rather striking that a positive impact on price emerges (+6.2 percent),
yet in all cases where Riesling has more than an overall impact on wine price, it is
outstandingly negative (Riesling from Victoria, South East, Barossa and Coonawarra).
In the case of Riesling from Coonawarra (-38.3 percent), the impact appears to be so
strong that it stands out against a rather positive impact associated with Sauvignon
Blanc from Coonawarra (+12.3 percent).
Somewhat below expectation is the impact that Chardonnay has on price (+9.7 percent),
although consumers appear to value rather highly this grape when it originates from
Hunter or Barossa Valley (+9.7 percent and +14.6 percent respectively). However, the
impact from Yarra Valley (-14.3 percent), which is located in Victoria, together with the
more than overall impact of Chardonnay in the case of its conditional eﬀect on Victoria
(-9.3 percent) may be part of the explanation for the relatively low impact of Chardonnay
on price.
The distinct positive eﬀect of Sauvignon Blanc, relative to the negative impact of Semil-
lon, is reﬂected both in terms of an overall, as well as a regional, impact on price and can
be seen in the case of Coonawarra (+12.3 percent) and New South Wales (-29.3 percent).
4 Marketing implications
4.1 The revenue impact of shifts in attributes
Bearing in mind the interpretation of our estimation results, we can demonstrate that
implicit price estimates could be usefully employed, even if we are lacking the necessary
information to analyse the structure of demand for attributes. Consider that a labelling
attribute is found to explain a positive or negative deviation from the unit price evaluated
at the sample means. In this case, a retailer could investigate the revenue impact of
altering a particular range of labelling attributes on display. Supposing the retailer
intends to shift the available attributes on display from Riesling from Coonawarra (RIC)
to a Sauvignon Blanc from Coonawarra (SAC), a proportionate adjustment to the mean
price can be found in three steps. First, we need to identify the proportionate loss for
the type of wine that is replaced, and the standard errors involved. Second, we need to
account for the market share of wine to be removed from the overall sample. Third, we
collect the adjusted premium for the aﬀected region, and weight this pivot variable by the
results from the ﬁrst and second step. The following box (Box 1) aims to demonstrate
the implementation of this procedure.
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Box 1: The revenue impact of a shift in labelling attributes
Step 1: It is necessary to identify the proportionate loss for the pivotal attribute that we wish to replace. Therefore, all
the attributes involved for which explicit coeﬃcients have been estimated have to be identiﬁed ﬁrst. As shown below, we
should also account for the certainty of the joint eﬀects, as derived from the variance covariance matrix of the estimated
coeﬃcients. We suggest to compute the proportionate loss and the corresponding standard errors in three sub-steps.
(a) Find the total sum of the relevant estimated coeﬃcients:
SAC RIC TOTAL
.1161 .4815 = .5976
(b) Compute the corresponding joint standard error, assuming initially that all parameters have zero covariances:
SE SAC SE RIC TOTAL SE
[(.0217)2 +(.0619)2]1/2 =.0656
(c) Find the proportionate loss or gain from the log-lin model, considering both all relevant estimated coeﬃcients and the
corresponding certainty of the joint eﬀects, as in equation (4),
g? = exp
(
cˆ− 12 Vˆ (cˆ)
)
− 1,
where Vˆ (cˆ) is an estimate of the variance of cˆ, the coeﬃcient of the dummy. Therefore,
g? = exp
[
(.5976)− 12 (.0656)2
]
− 1 = .8138
In order to take an estimate of the variance into account, pre-multiply the corresponding values of the variance-covariance
matrix by (1,-1), recognising positive and negative correlation between coeﬃcients, and then post-multiply by the transpose
of this unit vector. The corresponding standard error estimate is 0.07.
We can conﬁrm this result by considering that for any random variable x and y, var(x+ y) = var(x) + var(y) + 2cov(x, y).
Considering our example, we take the negative value of the covariance (in a stock-transfer with several variables, e.g. a
stock-transfer across regional origin, we would add the covariances of those variables that move together and consider that
the covariances of all those variables that move into the opposite direction subtract). This will result in the same standard
error.
As a result, the proportionate loss accounting for the variance estimate is 81.32 percent (81.38 percent from the above), and
applies to the market share of the desired attribute bundle (RIC).
g? = exp
[
(.5976)− 12 (.07)2
]
− 1 = .8132
Step 2: Identify the market share of the attribute bundle to be removed from the overall sample, hence the retailer's
intended stock transfer: In our example, the 18 bottles of Riesling from Coonawarra correspond to 1.2 percent of the total
sample of 1.495 bottles.
Step 3: Obtain the adjusted premium for the aﬀected attribute (Coonawarra) by applying Kennedy's (1981) adjustment
(equation (4)), and weight this pivot attribute (the region) by the results from step (1) and (2). The adjusted coeﬃcient for
Cabernet-Sauvignon is 22.24 percent (Appendix C, Table 3). As a result, the monetary impact of this stock transfer, hence
the proportionate adjustment to the overall mean price, is:
1.2224× 1.204× .8132 = 1.197 percent.
Given the mean price of 557 pence per bottle, the proportionate adjustment to the mean price would be 6.67 pence a bottle,
if a stock-transfer of Riesling from Coonawarra to Sauvignon Blanc from Coonawarra was intended.
The proportionate adjustment to the overall mean price is derived under the assumption
that the retailer can shift the attribute bundle without oﬀering special discounts when
more is purchased. Thus, demand is assumed perfectly price elastic. This will be an
acceptable assumption if we are considering consumer demand from an individual retailer.
Given the above results, we could argue that a retailer could engage in a more eﬃcient
stocking policy than in the absence of information on the attribute level. A simple price
comparison across bottles will not reveal the contribution of the positive/negative price
premium for certain attributes to the total change in revenue. Furthermore, in a dynamic
setting and with knowledge of demographic variables (scanner data), the retailer would be
able to control demand on the attribute level and thus undertake a dynamic optimisation
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problem that is more eﬃcient than a simple price comparison over time. With knowledge
of demand functions on the attribute level, the retailer could use price elasticity estimates
to obtain a more reﬁned prediction of the revenue impact of particular stock-transfers.
5 Concluding remarks
We have employed hedonic price analysis to reveal the values which market participants
place on labelling information. Estimation results deliver information on wine consumer
preferences for attributes contained in the label on Australian wine bottles. By means
of a parametric approach, implicit prices for these attributes are derived from prices and
quantities of wines sold in the British oﬀ-licence market.
The results suggest that consumers attach a high value to the information about those
attributes, namely the retailers, that were initially assumed as having no bearing on the
use value of the wines. However, in the absence of detailed information on the retailer
traits, we cannot reveal the origin of these distinctive valuations. Interaction terms are
employed in order to reveal the diﬀerential eﬀects between attributes, and where these are
found to be relevant, consumers are viewed as regarding attribute bundles as imperfect
substitutes.
Although many grape varieties are found to be given a highly distinct valuation by
market participants, our results suggest that regions, rather than grape varieties, are
considered as a proxy for a brand. This contrasts with the general observation that
grape varietal labelling is one of the distinctive features of New World wines. Our ﬁnding
may be explained by a shift in reputation for Australian wines over time. Together with
the beginning production and export boom of Australia in the early 1990's, increasing
promotional eﬀorts were geared towards company brands and grape varieties. Thus our
results appear to support the assertion that reputation for regional origins during the
mid 1990's has shifted towards reputation for grape varieties and company brands today.
We demonstrate that implicit price estimates could be usefully employed, even if we are
lacking the necessary information to analyse the structure of demand for attributes. The
valuation of attribute information as derived from hedonic analysis permits the analyst
to determine the revenue impact of shifts in attributes at a given stage in the marketing
chain. Thus, both marketers and producers could achieve a more eﬃcient tailoring of
marketing and production eﬀorts to speciﬁc consumer groups due to their knowledge of
consumers' valuation of labelling attributes. Revenue implications of changes in labelling
policy on the retail level could thus be considered.
However, several caveats remain. The analysis is inherently static and does not account
explicitly for valuation due to repeat purchases or diﬀerent advertising intensity across
wines. Due to the nature of the data (dummy variables), limited functional ﬂexibility
may limit the validity of the estimates. However, early studies have already shown that
such constraints may not be as limiting as initially considered (Butler (1982), Bartik and
Smith (1987)). Furthermore, the question remains as to whether the attributes included
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as variables in the regression are proxies for other attributes, which themselves are the
'true' attributes in the eyes of the consumers. In a future analysis of wine markets, the
hedonic framework may, therefore, be accompanied by performing a conjoint analysis.
However, if conjoint analyses treat price as an attribute of the good, the relation between
part-worth utility and revealed preference is not as clear as it is in hedonic analysis.
Also, conjoint analysis assumes that consumers behave as though tradeoﬀs are being
considered, yet the tradeoﬀ model may be only a gross approximation to the actual
decision rules that are employed (Payson (1994)). In contrast, hedonic pricing allows
the identiﬁcation of consumer preferences in the proximity of observed choices and thus
avoids some of the well-known biases that arise in conjoint analysis from a survey of
consumers' willingness-to-pay for hypothetical items.
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APPENDIX A
Table 1: Retail outlets distinguished by commercial forms
27 Supermarket 37 Wine specialist 18 Hypermarket 5 Large retailer 7 Others
outlets outlets outlets outlets
7 Tesco 4 Wine Rack 6 Asda 2 Littlewoods 1 Coop
3 Coop 14 Victoria Wines 1 Morrisons 3 Marks and Spencer 1 Cullen's
1 Somerﬁeld 3 Unwin's 1 Safeway 1 Europa Food
1 Kwiksave 8 Thresher 6 Sainsbury 1 Gateway
6 Safeway 2 Oddbins 1 Scotmid (Coop) 1 Independant
6 Sainsbury 2 Majestic 3 Tesco 1 Kwiksave
3 Waitrose 2 Cellar Five 1 Spar
1 Bottom's up
1 Haddows
Source: CFCE, 1994
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APPENDIX B
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Number of Mean*** Standard Variance Minimum Maximum
description observations Deviation
PRICE (¿) 1495** (274*) (5.57) (2.186) (4.7786) 2.19 16.99
ASDA 18 1.82E-02 0.13409 1.80E-02 0 1
MARKS AND SPENCER 24 4.01E-02 0.19666 3.87E-02 0 1
SAFEWAY 3 7.30E-03 8.53E-02 7.27E-03 0 1
SAINSBURY 48 2.92E-02 0.16867 2.84E-02 0 1
TESCO 36 2.92E-02 0.16867 2.84E-02 0 1
VINTAGE-88 8 1.46E-02 0.12016 1.44E-02 0 1
VINTAGE-90 117 8.39E-02 0.27781 7.27E-02 0 1
VINTAGE-91 103 0.10949 0.13282 9.79E-02 0 1
VINTAGE-93 438 0.24088 0.4284 0.18352 0 1
BAROSSA VALLEY 58 4.74E-02 0.21298 4.54E-02 0 1
COONAWARRA 162 9.12E-02 0.28848 8.32E-02 0 1
GOULBURN VALLEY 8 1.46E-02 0.12016 1.44E-02 0 1
HUNTER VALLEY 172 7.66E-02 0.26651 7.10E-02 0 1
KINGS VALLEY 4 7.30E-03 8.53E-02 7.27E-02 0 1
NEW SOUTH WALES 18 2.55E-02 0.15807 2.50E-02 0 1
RIVERINA 8 7.30E-03 8.53E-02 7.27E-03 0 1
SOUTH 451 0.32847 0.47052 0.22138 0 1
SOUTH EAST 486 0.28832 0.45381 0.20594 0 1
VICTORIA 39 3.28E-02 0.17856 3.19E-02 0 1
WEST 9 1.09E-02 0.10425 1.09E-02 0 1
YARRA VALLEY 42 2.55E-02 0.15807 2.50E-02 0 1
CABERNET SAUVIGNON 278 0.18978 0.39285 0.15433 0 1
CABERNET SHIRAZ 175 8.03E-02 0.27224 7.41E-02 0 1
CHARDONNAY 403 0.21533 0.4118 0.16958 0 1
PINOT NOIR 15 1.46E-02 0.12016 1.44E-02 0 1
RIESLING 62 4.74E-02 0.21298 4.54E-02 0 1
SEMILLON 50 5.47E-02 0.2279 5.19E-02 0 1
SEMILLON CHARDONNAY 161 8.03E-02 0.27244 7.41E-02 0 1
SAUVIGNON 66 4.74E-02 0.21298 4.54E-02 0 1
COLOMBARD CHARDONNAY 36 2.55E-02 0.15807 2.50E-02 0 1
* There are 274 unique and hence diﬀerent bottles in the sample. Corresponding descriptive statistics are in brackets. Since the same
unique bottle appears frequently in diﬀerent outlets, the total sample size is 1495.
** The diﬀerence between the total sum of all observed prices after accounting for replicates [1495] and the sum of observations for
the above attributes as they remained in the ﬁnal speciﬁcation, is therefore due to (a) statistically non-signiﬁcant attributes and
(b) the nature of the data set (some wines are speciﬁed by less attributes than others: indication of the retailer's name from which
the price was collected is only given if the retailer's name appears on the label of the bottle).
*** The sample mean applies to the observations not accounting for replicates, which explains the divergence between the proportion
of non-zero's of each attribute in each category (i.e. the mean value) and the number of observations.
E-02 and E-03 denote 10−2 and 10−3, respectively.
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Table 3: Estimation results of the log-lin hedonic model
Variable Variable Relative Estimated Standard T-Ratio
description name impact** coeﬃcient Error
(percent)
CONSTANT 1.6842 6.34E-03 265.60
RETAILER NAME ASDA -15.89 -0.17192 4.78E-02 -3.60
RETAILER NAME MARKS AND SPENCER 30.26 0.26501 3.59E-02 7.38
RETAILER NAME SAINSBURY -17.57 -0.19269 3.07E-02 -6.28
RETAILER NAME TESCO -7.79 -8.05E-02 3.45E-02 -2.33
INTERACTION TERM CHAR-VICTORIA -9.30 -9.49E-02 7.38E-02 -1.29
INTERACTION TERM CHAR-HUNTER 9.71 -9.32E-02 3.13E-02 2.98
INTERACTION TERM CHAR-BAROSSA 14.56 0.1378 6.07E-02 2.27
INTERACTION TERM CAB SAUV-COONAWARRA 26.25 0.2336 3.07E-02 7.60
INTERACTION TERM CAB SAUV-NEW SOUTH WALES -39.37 -0.49349 0.1169 -4.22
INTERACTION TERM RIESLING VICTORIA -32.37 -0.38536 0.1078 -3.58
INTERACTION TERM RIESLING-SOUTH EAST -5.11 -5.17E-02 3.65E-02 -1.42
INTERACTION TERM RIESLING-BAROSSA -28.32 -0.32502 0.1255 -2.59
INTERACTION TERM RIESLING-COONAWARRA -38.33 -0.48147 6.19E-02 -7.77
INTERACTION TERM SAUVIGNON-COONAWARRA 12.29 0.11611 2.17E-02 5.34
INTERACTION TERM SEMILLON-NEW SOUTH WALES -29.29 -0.33626 0.1435 -2.34
VINTAGE *1988 21.26 0.19551 7.44E-02 2.63
VINTAGE 1990 20.51 0.18674 1.98E-02 9.42
VINTAGE 1991 3.90 3.84E-02 1.84E-02 2.09
VINTAGE 1993 -9.01 -9.44E-02 -9.62E-03 -9.81
REGION OF ORIGIN BAROSSA VALLEY 9.31 8.95E-02 3.03E-02 2.96
REGION OF ORIGIN COONAWARRA 22.24 0.20111 2.36E-02 8.54
REGION OF ORIGIN GOULBURN VALLEY 14.28 0.13623 7.38E-02 1.85
REGION OF ORIGIN HUNTER VALLEY 11.11 0.10566 2.31E-02 4.57
REGION OF ORIGIN KINGS VALLEY 16.93 0.16207 0.1068 1.52
REGION OF ORIGIN NEW SOUTH WALES -6.52 -6.58E-02 5.62E-02 -1.17
REGION OF ORIGIN RIVERINA -34.30 -0.41654 8.32E-02 -5.01
REGION OF ORIGIN SOUTH -4.11 -4.20E-02 9.13E-03 -4.60
REGION OF ORIGIN SOUTH EAST -8.61 -9.00E-002 9.30E-03 -9.68
REGION OF ORIGIN VICTORIA 15.53 0.14529 4.28E-02 3.40
REGION OF ORIGIN WEST 11.94 0.11531 7.08E-02 1.63
REGION OF ORIGIN *YARRA -14.29 -0.15355 3.50E-02 -4.38
GRAPE VARIETY CAB SAUVIGNON 2.37 2.35E-02 1.27E-02 1.85
GRAPE VARIETY CABERNET SHIRAZ -13.96 -0.15021 1.68E-02 -8.95
GRAPE VARIETY CHARDONNAY 9.72 9.28E-02 1.03E-02 -8.98
GRAPE VARIETY PINOT NOIR 90.43 0.64562 5.46E-02 11.82
GRAPE VARIETY RIESLING 6.21 6.08E-02 3.52E-02 1.73
GRAPE VARIETY SEMILLON -10.06 -0.10553 3.17E-02 -3.33
GRAPE VARIETY SEMILLON CHARDONNAY -12.98 -0.13884 1.68E-02 -8.27
GRAPE VARIETY SAUVIGNON 12.58 0.11893 3.10E-02 3.84
GRAPE VARIETY COLOMBARD-CHARDONNAY -17.18 -0.18788 3.55E-02 -5.30
• 1465 degrees of freedom
• Adjusted R-square: 0.56.
• Breusch-Pagan: Chi-Square = 26.6 with 38 D.F. [for 40 D.F., P(chi-square > 55.76) = 0.05; for for 30 D.F., P(chi-square > 43.77)
= 0.05].
• Variables preceded by a * are taken from symmetric regressions.
• ** The relative impact of the attribute on price is measured as in equation (4).
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